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2ABSTRACT
"Informal" know-how trading is the extensive exchange of proprietary
know-how by informal networks of process engineers in rival (and non-rival)
firms.  I have observed such know-how trading networks to be very active in the
US steel minimill industry and elsewhere, and they appear to represent a novel
form of cooperative R&D.
When one examines informal know-how trading in the framework of a
"Prisoner's Dilemma", real-world conditions can be specified where this behavior
both does and does not make economic sense from the point of view of
participating firms.  Data available to date on the presence and absence of such
trading seem to be roughly in accordance with the predictions of this simple
model.
Although presently documented only as a firm-level phenomenon involving
the trading of proprietary technical know-how,  informal know-how trading seems
relevant to (and may currently exist in), many other types of situation.  Indeed, it
may be applicable to any situation in which individuals or organizations are
involved in a competition where possession of proprietary know-how represents a
form of competitive advantage.
3   Cooperation Between Rivals:
   Informal Know-How Trading
1.0: Introduction
It has long been recognized that it is difficult for an innovating firm to fully
appropriate the benefits arising from its innovations, and that desired research
might therefore not be performed (1).  One sometimes possible solution to this
dilemma is cooperative R&D conducted by firms who share the costs and benefits
of particular R&D projects (2).
In this paper I explore a novel type of cooperative R&D: the informal
trading of proprietary know-how between rival (and non-rival) firms.  I have
observed this behavior to be widespread in one industry.  I propose that the
phenomenon makes economic sense, and that it may be present in many
industries.  Indeed, it may be applicable to any situation in which individuals or
organizations are involved in a competition where possession of proprietary know-
how represents a form of competitive advantage.
I begin by briefly characterizing informal know-how trading as I have
observed it to date (section 2).  Next, I present a case study of the phenomenon
involving the trading of proprietary process know-how among US steel minimill
firms (section 3).  Then, I explore whether and when technology trading between
direct competitors is an economically advantageous form of cooperative R&D
from the viewpoint of participating firms (section 4).  I then place know-how
trading in the context of other forms of R&D cooperation (section 5) and, finally, I
4discuss how the phenomenon may apply beyond the arena of interfirm trading of
R&D-related knowledge (section 6). 
2.0: A General Description of Informal Know-How Trading
Know-how is the accumulated practical skill or expertise which allows one
to do something smoothly and efficiently.  The know-how which I focus on here is
that held in the minds of a firm's engineers who develop its products and develop
and operate its processes.  Often, a firm considers a significant portion of such
know-how proprietary and protects it as a trade secret. 
A firm's staff of engineers is responsible for obtaining or developing the
know-how its firm needs.  When required know-how is not available in-house, an
engineer typically cannot find what he needs in publications either:  Much is very
specialized and not published anywhere.  He must either develop it himself or
learn what he needs to know by talking to other specialists.  Since in-house
development can be time-consuming and expensive, there can be a high incentive
to seek the needed information from professional colleagues.  And often, logically
enough, engineers in firms which make similar products or use similar processes
are the people most likely to have that needed information.  But are such
professional colleagues willing to reveal their proprietary know-how to employees
of rival firms?  Interestingly, it appears that the answer is quite uniformly "yes" in
at least one industry, and quite probably in many.
The informal proprietary know-how trading behavior which I have observed
to date appears to involve informal trading "networks" which develop between
engineers having common professional interests.  Network formation begins
when, at conferences and elsewhere, an engineer makes private judgements as to
the areas of expertise and abilities of those he meets, and builds his personal
informal list of possibly useful expert contacts.  Later, when "Engineer A"
5encounters a product or process development problem he finds difficult, he
activates his network by calling Engineer B, an appropriately knowledgeable
contact who works for a directly competing (or non-competing) firm, for advice. 
B makes a judgment as to the competitive value of the information A is
requesting.  If it seems to him vital to his own firm's competitive position, he will
not provide it.  However, if it seems useful but not crucial - and if A seems to be a
potentially useful and appropriately knowledgeable expert who may be of
future value to B - B will answer his request as well as he can and/or refer him to
other experts of his acquaintance.  B may go to considerable lengths to help A:  He
may, for example, run a special simulation for him on his firm's computer system. 
At the same time, A realizes that in asking for and accepting the help, he is
incurring an obligation to provide similar help to B - or to another referred by B -
at some future date.  No explict accounting of favors given and received is kept in
instances studied to date, but the obligation to return a favor seems strongly felt by
recipients - "... a gift always looks for recompense" (3).
3.0: Case Study: Informal Trading of Proprietary Process Know-How Among US
"Minimill" Steel Producers
To date, information on informal know-how trading between rivals is most
complete in the instance of process know-how trading in the US steel minimill
industry.  I present it here as an existence test of the general phenomenon we are
discussing, and as a means of conveying its flavor. 
Minimills, unlike "integrated" steel plants, do not produce steel from iron
ore.  Rather, they begin with steel scrap which they melt in an electric arc furnace. 
Then, they adjust the chemistry of the molten steel, cast it in continuous casters
and roll it into steel shapes.  Modern facilities and relatively low labor, capital and
6materials costs have enabled US steel minimill firms to compete extremely
effectively against the major integrated US steel producers in recent years. 
Indeed, they have essentially driven US integrated producers out of the market for
many commodity products.
The term minimill is not precisely defined, and is becoming less so as
"minimill" plants grow in size and complexity.  Early minimills were relatively
small (50,000 - 150,000 tons per year capacity) and produced primarily
commodity products such as the reinforcing bar used in the construction industry. 
Today, however, some individual plants approach 1,000,000 tons annual capacity
and many are reaching far beyond commodity products into forging quality, alloy
steel, stainless steel and "nearly any steel grade capable of being melted in an
electric furnace" (4).
There are approximately 60 steel minimill plants (and approximately 40
producers) in the US today.   The most productive of these have surpassed their
Japanese competitors in terms of tons of steel per labor hour input, and are
regarded as among the world leaders in this process. 
3.1  Methods
The sample of minimills studied here is a subset of a recent listing of
minimill plants published in Iron and Steel Engineer.  This listing (5) contained 45
US firms with one or more minimill plants.  I selected the four firms with the
largest annual molten steel production capacity ("melt capacity") from this list,
and then added six others selected at random from the same list.  Later, some
interviewees in these firms suggested that I also study Quanex Corporation
(because it was viewed as an industry outlier in terms of know-how trading
behavior) and so I also added this firm.  All firms included in the study sample are
identified in Table 1.
7 Table 1: US Steel Minimill Firm Sample
STEEL MINIMILL FIRM                               MELT CAPACITYa
  (Tons/Year,000)
Four Largest Firms
Chaparral, Midllothian, TX   1,400
Florida Steel, Tampa, Fla 1,578
North Star, Salt Lake City, UT  2,300
Nucor, Charlotte, NC   2,000
Other (Randomly Selected)
Bayou Steel, LaPlace, LA   650
Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, McMinnville, OR 250
Charter Electric Melting, Chicago, IL   130
Kentucky Electric Steel, Ashland, KY   280
Marathon Steel, Tempe, Arizb   185
Raritan River Steel, Perth Amboy, NJ  500
Specially Selected Outlier
Quanex, Houston, TX    
___________________
a Source:  Edward L. Nemeth, "Mini-Midi Mills - U.S., Canada and Mexico", Iron
and Steel Engineer 61:6 (June 1984), Table 1, pp. 30-34.
b Firm closed in July, 1985.
Interviews were conducted with plant managers and other managers with
direct knowledge of manufacturing and manufacturing process engineering at each
firm in the study sample.  The questioning, mostly by telephone, was focused by
an interview guide, and addressed two areas primarily: (1) Has your firm / does
your firm develop proprietary know-how which would be of interest to your
competitors?  If so, give concrete examples of process or product improvements
8which you have developed, and some estimate of their value.  (2) Do you trade
proprietary know-how with your competitors?  With whom?  Do you hold
anything back?  What?  Why?  Give concrete examples.
The source of major, well-known innovations claimed by interviewees was
cross-checked by asking interviewees in several firms, "Which firm developed
x?"   The accuracy of self-reported trading behavior could not be so checked.  I
nevertheless have confidence in the pattern found because interviewees in all but
one of the sampled firms provided independent, detailed discussions of very
similar trading behavior. 
3.2: Results
Personnel at all firms except Quanex (selected for study specifically because
its behavior differed from the norm) reported routinely trading proprietary process
know-how  - sometimes with direct competitors.  This finding strikes me as
impressive, because conventional wisdom might suggest that know-how trading
between rivals is rare.
 Table 2: Know-How Trading Patterns
   In-House
Steel Minimill Firm                   Process Devel?                Know-How Trade?
Four Largest Firms
Chaparral MAJOR Yes 
Florida Steel Minor Yes
North Star Minor Yes
Nucor MAJOR Yes
Other
Bayou Steel Minor Yes
Cascade Steel Minor Yes
Charter Elec Minor Yes
Kentucky Electric Minor Yes
9Marathon Steel Minor Yes
Raritan River Minor Yes
Quanex Minor NO
Interestingly, reported know-how trading often appeared to go far beyond
an arms-length exchange of data at conferences.  Interviewees reported that,
sometimes, operating employees of competitors were trained (at no charge), firm
personnel were sent to the plants of competitors to help set up unfamiliar
equipment, etc. 
Of course, the firms which report informal know-how trading with
competitors in Table 2 do not trade with every competitor, and do not necessarily
trade with each other.  (The interviewed firms differ widely in technical
accomplishment and, as we will see later, it is reasonable that a firm will only
offer to trade valuable know-how with those who can reciprocate in kind.) 
Before turning to consider why the trading of proprietary process know-how
occurs in the steel minimill industry, let us examine that behavior in more detail
under three headings: (1) Did minimills studied in fact develop/have proprietary
process know-how of potential value to direct competitors; (2) did firms
possessing know-how sometimes trade it with direct competitors (rivals); and (3)
was know-how in fact "traded", as opposed to simply revealed without expectation
of a return of similarly valuable know-how?
3.2.1: Valuable Know-How?
Since many minimill products are commodities, it is logical that process
innovations which save production costs will be of significant value to innovating
firms, and of significant interest to direct competitors.  Barnett and Schorsch (6)
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report US minimill 1981 costs to manufacture wire rod (a reasonably
representative commodity minimill product) to be as shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Minimill Costs Per Ton (Wire Rod, 1981)
Cost Category        Dollars per Ton  Percent of Total
Labor     $60 21%
Steel Scrap 93 33%
Energy 45 16%
Other Operatinga    65                                      23%
Total Operating   $263
Depreciation 11  4%
Interest 7  2%
Misc. Tax  3                                         1%    
TOTAL COSTSb    $284     100%
_____________
Source: Donald F. Barnett and Louis Schorsch, Steel: Upheaval in a Basic
Industry (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1983), Table 4-3, p.95.
a Includes alloying agents, refractories, rolls, etc.
b Excluding any return on equity.
On the basis of Table 3 data, it seems reasonable that all minimills would
have a keen interest in know-how which would reduce their labor and/or energy
costs.  And, indeed, all interviewed reported making in-house improvements to
methods or equipment in order to reduce these costs.  In addition, some reported
making process innovations which increased the range of products which they
could produce.
Nucor and Chaparral conduct major and continuing in-house process
development efforts (conducted, interestingly, by their production groups rather
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than by separate R&D departments).  Thus, Nucor is now investing millions in a
process to continuously cast thin slabs of steel.  If successful, this process will
allow minimills to produce wide shapes as well as narrow ones, and will perhaps
double the size of the market open to minimill producers - an advance of
tremendous value to the industry. 
The in-house know-how development efforts of other interviewed minimills
are much less ambitious, consisting mainly of relatively small refinements in
process equipment and technique.  For example, one firm is experimenting with a
water-cooled furnace roof which is more horizontal (has less pitch) than that of
other minimill firms.  (The effect of the flatter furnace roof is expected to be
increased clearance and faster furnace loading times, a cost advantage.)   Other
firms develop modified rollers for their rolling mills which allow them to make
better or different steel shapes, and so forth.   While many such process
refinements have only a small individual impact on production costs, their
collective impact can be large (7).
In sum, then, most steel minimill firms do appear to develop proprietary
know-how which would be of significant value to at least some of their
competitors.
3.2.2: Direct Competitors?
Our next question is: Are steel minimill firms which trade know-how in fact
direct competitors (rivals)?  If they are, we have found informal know-how trading
to exist under conditions where, on the face of it, it would seem least likely. 
Direct competitors would seem to be the type of firm most able to turn traded
proprietary know-how to a trader's direct disadvantage.
Many minimills do compete directly with each other today, although this
was not always the case.  When minimills began to emerge in the late 1950's to
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late 1960's, they were usually located in smaller regional markets and were
protected by transportation costs from severe competition with other minimills. 
Today, however, there are many minimill firms and significant competition
between neighboring plants.  In addition, the production capacity of minimill
plants has steadily increased, and the larger facilities "define their markets as
widely as do integrated [steel mill] facilities" (8). 
Some minimill interviewees report that they do trade know-how with
personnel from directly competing plants.  Others report that they "try to" avoid
direct transfer to such rivals - but are aware that they cannot control indirect
transfer.  (Since traders cannot control the behavior of those who acquire their
information, the noncompeting firms they select to trade with may later transfer
that information to direct competitors.)
3.2.3: Is It Really Trading? 
Proprietary know-how is only a subject for trading if free diffusion can be
prevented.  Therefore I asked interviewees: "Could the proprietary know-how you
develop in-house in fact be kept secret if you wanted to do this?"
In the instance of know-how embodied in equipment and visible in a plant
tour, free diffusion was considered hard to prevent.  Many people visit minimill
plants.  Members of steelmaking associations visit by invitation, and association
members include direct competitors.  In principle, such visits could be prevented,
but the value of doing so is unclear, since two other categories of visitors could
not be as easily excluded.  First, suppliers of process equipment often visit plants
for reasons ranging from sales to repair to advice.  They are expert at detecting
equipment modification, and are quick to diffuse such information around the
industry.  Second, customers often request plant tours in order to assure
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themselves of product quality, and may notice and/or request information on
process changes.
On the other hand, interviewees seem to believe that they can effectively
restrict access to know-how if they really want to, and there is evidence for this on
a general level.  Thus, Nucor and Chaparral both attempt to exert some control
over their process innovations, and interviewees at other firms think they have
some success.  Quanex does not allow plant visits at all, and feels it effectively
protects its know-how thereby.
Data on this matter are also available at the level of specific innovations,
although we have not yet collected it systematically.  As an example, however, a
firm with a policy of being generally open reported that it nevertheless was able to
successfully restrict access to a minor rolling innovation for several years.  (That
firm reported gaining an "extra" $140 per ton because it was the only minimill
able to roll a particular shape desired by some customers.  It apparently only lost
control of its innovation when production people explained it to a direct
competitor at a professional association meeting.) 
Interviewees, including top management, were aware of know-how
exchange patterns in their industry and emphasized that they were not giving
know-how away  -  they were consciously trading information whose value they
recognized.  Thus, Bayou Steel: "How much is exchanged depends on what the
other guy knows - must be reciprocal".  Chaparral Steel: "If they don't let us in [to
their plant] we won't let them in [to ours] - must be reciprocal".  Such statements
appear to me to have weight because most interviewees who did engage in
information exchange had clearly thought about whom to trade with and why. 
When asked, they were able to go into considerable detail about the types of firms
they did and did not deal with, and why dealing with a given firm would or would
not involve a valuable two-way exchange of know-how.
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Know-how trading in the steel minimill industry is not centrally controlled
beyond (sometimes) the provision of general guidelines by top management. 
Also, no one appears to be explicitly counting up the precise value of what is
given or received by a firm, and a simultaneous exchange of valuable information
is not insisted upon.  However, in an informal way, participants seemed to strive to
keep a balance in value given and received, without resorting to explicit
calculation.  On average over many transactions, a reasonable balance may in fact
be achieved, although individual errors in judgment are easy to cite.  (For
example, in the instance of the minor rolling innovation mentioned above, the
innovating firm's sales department was furious when, in their view, engineering
"simply gave" the unique process know-how, and the associated monopoly profit,
away.)
3.2.4: Quanex, The Exception
Quanex was the sole exception to the minimill trading norm which I found. 
The firm was not on the list of minimills which I used to generate the study
sample, and I only became aware of it and its outlier status because I routinely
asked each firm interviewed if it knew of any firm whose trading behavior differed
from its own. 
When contacted, Quanex explained its behavior by saying that, first, it did
not trade because it felt it had nothing to learn from competing firms (a contention
disputed by some interviewees).  Second, it said that, while it did produce steel by
a minimill-like process, it produced specialty steels and considered its real rivals
to be other specialty steel producers (e.g., Timkin) and not minimills.   And,
Quanex reported, it was not an outlier with respect to specialty steel producers
where, it said, secrecy rather than trading was the norm.  (I think this latter point
very interesting, but will not pursue it here.  If confirmed, it suggests that know-
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how trading patterns may differ between closely related industries. This in turn
opens the way to empirical study of the underlying causes of know-how trading
under well-controlled conditions.) 
3.3: Other Empirical Evidence Regarding Know-How Trading
Is know-how trading unique to the US minimill industry?  Or is it a
significant form of R&D cooperation in many industries?
At the moment, I am aware of only three sources of empirical data on this
important matter - and these tend to suggest that informal know-how trading exists
in many industries.
First, my students and I have now conducted pilot interviews in several US
industries in addition to steel minimills.  And, on an anecdotal basis, I can report
that we have found informal know-how trading apparently quite common in some
industries, and essentially absent in others.  Thus, self-report by interviewees
suggests that trading is widespread among aerospace firms and waferboard
manufacturing mills, but rare or absent among powdered metals fabricators and
producers of the biological enzyme klenow.  (Interestingly, however, trading
seems a more quasi-covert, secretive activity by engineering staffs in some of
these industries than was the case in steel minimills.  In minimills, top
management was typically aware of trading and approved.  This does not seem to
be necessarily the case in all industries where significant trading is present.)
Second, data in a study by Thomas Allen, et al. (9), of a sample of Irish,
Spanish and Mexican firms appears consistent with what I am calling informal
know-how trading.  Allen examined the "most significant change, in either product
or process" which had occurred in each of 102 firms during recent years. 
Interviews were conducted with innovation participants to determine the source of
the initial idea for the innovation and important sources of help used in
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implemention.  Coding of the data showed that approximately 23% of the
important information in these categories came from some form of personal
contact with "apparent competitors". 
T. Allen elaborates on the behavior observed: 
In a typical scenario, the manager from one of these firms might visit
a trade show in another country, and be invited on plant visit by
representatives of a foreign firm.  While there he would encounter some
new manufacturing technique that he would later introduce into his own
firm.  In other cases managers approached apparently competing firms in
other countries directly and were provided with surprisingly free access to
their technology (10).
Finally, Robert Allen (11) reports on a phenomenon he calls "collective
invention" in the nineteenth-century English steel industry - and I think that what
he has observed might in fact be an example of informal know-how trading.
Allen explored progressive change in two important attributes of iron
furnaces during 1850-1875 in England's Cleveland district:  an increase in the
height of furnace chimneys, and an increase in the temperature of the "blast" air
pumped into an iron furnace during operation.  Both types of technical change
resulted in a significant and progressive improvement in the energy efficiency of
iron production.  Next, he examined technical writings of the time, and found that
at least some who built new furnaces reaching new chimney heights and/or blast
temperatures publicly revealed data on their furnace design and performance in
meetings of professional societies and in published material.  Thus, it appeared
that some firms revealed data of apparent competitive value to both existing and
potential rivals, a phenomenon which he called collective invention.
The essential difference between know-how trading and collective invention
is that know-how trading involves an exchange of valuable information between
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traders which is at the same time kept secret from non-traders.  In contrast,
collective invention requires that all competitors and potential competitors be
given free access to proprietary know-how (12).  Allen finds that this free access
requirement presents interpretive difficulties, however.
(As will be seen later when I discuss the causes of know-how trading, the
difficulty Allen notes is not present if the iron manufacturers he examined were
actually engaged in know-how trading rather than in collective invention.  This
seems to me to be possible.  Allen deduced that technical data was made available
to all because he observed that much was published and presented to technical
societies.  Certainly, what was published was public:  But know-how with trading
value might well have been withheld from publication and/or published only when
it had lost proprietary status with the passage of time.  Both of these suggested
behaviors would be difficult to discern via written records but are, in fact, part of
the trading behavior of present-day firms.)
4.0: An Economic Explanation for Know-How Trading
I propose that it may be possible to explain both the presence and absence
of informal trading of proprietary know-how between rivals in terms of
maximizing the profits (rents) which firms reap from it.  (Although I will not
consider the matter here, benefits and costs experienced by individuals who
actually do the trading within firms can also be relevant.  I will return to this issue
in section 6.)  I begin by framing the phenomenon in the context of a Prisoner's
Dilemma, and then initially explore the plausibility of such a model by referring to
the small amount of real-world information currently available to us.
4.1: Know-How Trading as a Prisoner's Dilemma
Consider know-how trading between rivals as an example of a two-party
"Prisoner's Dilemma".  It has been shown that the two parties involved in such a
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Dilemma are likely to achieve the highest private gain over many interactions,
"moves in the game", if they cooperate (14).  However, each player is
continuously tempted to "defect" from cooperation, because he will reap higher
returns from a single move if he defects while his partner behaves cooperatively.
Two conditions must hold for a situation to be defined as a Prisoner's
Dilemma.  The first is that the value of the four possible outcomes must be t > r >
p > s, where: t is the payoff to the player who defects while the other cooperates; r
is the payoff to both players when both cooperate; p is the payoff to both players
when both defect; and, finally, s is the payoff to the player who cooperates when
the second player defects.  The second condition is that an even chance for each
player to exploit and be exploited on successive turns of the game does not result
in as profitable an outcome to players as does continuing mutual cooperation
(e.g., 2r > t + s). 
Let me begin placing know-how trading in the context of a two-party
Prisoner's Dilemma by observing that traded know-how is often possessed by
more than one firm prior to a trade.  Assume therefore that n-1 firms possess a
particular "unit" of knowhow prior to a given trade.  The total rent, Rtotal, which a
firm (player) possessing that knowhow reaps from it can then be expressed as: 
Rtotal = R +  delta R
Here, R is the rent which a firm may expect from implementing a unit of know-
how if it reveals it to its trading partner and, as a result, n firms possess that
knowhow.   Delta R is the extra increment of rent which the firm can expect to
garner if it does not trade the unit of proprietary know-how.  In that case only n-1
firms possess that unit, and the player possessing it therefore gains extra
competitive advantage from its use.  (In instances when a given unit of know-how
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is possessed by only one firm prior to a trade and by two post-trade, R will be a
duopoly rent and   delta R will be the monopoly rent associated with exclusive
possession of the know-how minus the duopoly rent.)
A Base Case
As a base case, assume that in each play of the game, two firms each start
out with one unit of proprietary know-how unknown to the other.  Assume also
that each of these two units, although different, has identical R and  delta R
associated with it.  Then, each firm starts with proprietary know-how having a pre-
play value of R +  delta R. 
Because knowledge is the good being traded here, a cooperative trade, r,
between the two firms will result in each firm having both units of know-how
post-trade, and each having the post-trade rent:
Rtotal  = 2  R
That is, post-trade each will have lost that increment of rent,  delta R, which was
associated with a more exclusive possession of its own knowhow unit, but will
have gained the additional rent associated with an additional know-how unit.
Similar reasoning allows us to work out the consequences of all four possible
outcomes of a single play of the game by the two firms as:
 t = 2R + delta R, r = 2R, p = R +  delta R, and s = R. 
We therefore find that both condition 1  (t > r > p > s) and condition 2 (2r >
t+s) required for a sitution to be defined as a Prisoner's Dilemma hold if R >   delta
R.  Therefore, if R >  delta R, a policy of know-how trading will usually pay better
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in the long run than any other strategy.  On the other hand, both conditions fail and
continuing defection or no exchange is the best option if R <  delta R.
The simple model just given can obviously be brought into more precise
alignment with the real world if we add refinements.  But, since at this point I have
only anecdotal data to use in testing, it is reasonable to defer complexity.  Instead,
I will attempt to assess the intuitive plausibility of the simple model by reference
to real-world examples.
When Proprietary Know-How Offers
Little Competitive Advantage
In essence, R >   delta R holds when the exclusive possession of a know-
how "unit" offers relatively little competitive advantage.  This is often the case in
the real world, I suggest.  To understand why, it is important to first understand a
little more about the actual nature of most (not all) proprietary know-how.
"Know-how" may have the ring of something precious and nonreproducible
to the nontechnical reader.  In fact, however, most proprietary know-how shares
two characteristics: (1) It is not vital to a firm, and (2) it can be independently
developed by any competent firm needing it, given an appropriate expenditure of
time and money.  Consider two examples of such "typical" proprietary know-how:
An engineer at an aerospace firm was having trouble manufacturing a
part from a novel composite material with needed precision.  He called a
professional colleague he knew at a rival firm and asked for advice.  As it
happens, that competitor had solved the problem by experimenting and
developing some process know-how involving mold design and processing
temperatures, and the colleague willingly passed along this information.
It was certainly convenient for the firm now facing the difficulty to learn of
a solution from the rival - but it was not in any way vital.  First, it was possible to
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struggle along without solving the problem at all.  The part was in fact being
made, but with a high scrap rate and much effort.  Second, the engineer assigned
to solve this problem was competent and could certainly develop a solution
independently given appropriate time and funds. 
Process engineers at a manufacturer of waferboard (a fabricated wood
product somewhat like plywood) were having trouble involving frequent
"jamming" of a production machine with wood being processed.  As it
happens, competitors had solved this problem by experimenting and
developing some process know-how involving the regulation of wood
moisture content.  When contacted, they passed along what they had
learned.
Again, it was convenient for the firm now facing the difficulty to know this
solution, but it was not essential or even very important.  First, the cost of
struggling on without solving the problem at all was not exorbitant:  Machine
operators could continue to cope simply by stopping the troublesome machine and
clearing it as often as necessary.  Second, a competent engineer assigned to solve
this problem could certainly solve it independently. 
When proprietary know-how does have the attributes just described, one can
perhaps intuitively see the plausibility of the model's prediction that rival firms
will find it profitable to engage in know-how trading.  Conceptually, the
consequences of noncooperation in know-how sharing under such conditions are
similar to those of a policy of not cooperating in sharing spare parts with direct
competitors who use an identical process machine.  An industrywide policy of
noncooperation among competitors with respect to spares would under most
circumstances not permanently deprive any firm of needed spares, nor otherwise
significantly affect the competitive position of rival firms in the industry.  It would
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simply result in increased downtime and/or spares-stocking costs for all - a net
loss for all relative to the consequences of a policy of cooperation.
When Proprietary Know-How Offers Significant Competitive Advantage
Sometimes, the competitive value of a unit of know-how is large, and  R <
delta R.  According to the model, one would then expect that informal know-how
trading would not occur.  I can illustrate this possibility with an interesting
example which appears to show know-how trading behavior shifting as the value
of a given type of know-how shifts over time.
Aerospace engineer interviewees have informed my students and me that
they freely exchange most know-how under "normal" conditions.  But, when a
competition for an important government contract is in the offing the situation
changes, and trading of information between rivals which might affect who wins
the contract stops.  Later, after the contract has been awarded, the same know-how
which was recently closely guarded will apparently again be traded freely.
The reported behavior seems reasonable.  Much aerospace know-how has
the characteristics discussed in the previous section:  It is not critical, and, under
"normal conditions" it can be independently reproduced by competent engineers if
need be.  Therefore, it is likely that R >   R, for such know-how, and that know-
how trading would therefore pay according to the model.  But, when a competition
for an important government contract is near, conditions are not normal.  Often,
there will not be enough time to produce needed know-how independently, and
therefore the  delta R value of a given piece of competition-related know-how
could increase temporarily.  If the increase reached the point where R <  delta R, it
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is reasonable according to the model that know-how trading temporarily stop - the
behavior in fact reported by interviewees.  And, of course, after the contract is
awarded it is reasonable that the  delta R value of competition-related know-how
will drop and trading resume, as interviewees report that it does.
In the example just given, the know-how at issue could have been
independently redeveloped by anyone who wanted it.  But the know-how
nonetheless yielded competitive advantage to its possessor because the time
needed for independent redevelopment was simply not available.  Sometimes,
however, know-how which can yield a major competitive advantage cannot be
routinely reinvented.  (It may, for example, be the result of unusual insight and/or
major research efforts.)  Then, R <  delta R for years, and trading of that know-
how may never be in the best interests of the firm possessing it.
When Proprietary Know-How Offers No Competitive Advantage
Unique possession of proprietary know-how offers essentially no
competitive advantage to a firm with respect to non-rivals.  Therefore I would
expect know-how trading to be to the advantage of firms in such a situation
(assuming that the traded information does not leak from non-rivals to rivals) and
would predict it to occur.  Anecdotal evidence available to this point supports this
prediction, but is certainly only of illustrative value.  For example, on the basis of
interviews I find that electric and gas utilities (which serve different regions and
are therefore not rivals) do appear to share know-how extensively.
When Diffusing Proprietary Knowhow Has Value
In at least some real-world conditions, it appears that competition is
enhanced by wide sharing of some know-how.  As an example, consider that the
establishment of uniform standards in a product category can sometimes enlarge
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markets and benefit all participating manufacturers.  (Recent examples include
standards set for computer networks and compact audio disks.)  The establishment
of such standards requires some sharing of know-how by participating firms.  As a
second example consider the sharing of proprietary information on safety hazards
between rivals such as the recent sharing of information on the hazards of dioxin
among rivals in the chemical industry. 
If Traders Have Different Amounts of Know-How
Our pilot research investigations to date show several instances in which the
large, relatively innovative firms in a product category examined appear to
energetically suppress trading by their employees, while smaller producers of the
same product types appear less restrictive.  Examples are Kraft in cheese products,
IBM in computers, P&G in paper goods.  On the other hand, this pattern does not
appear in the study of steel minimill firms, where the better-endowed firms seemed
to simply pick trading partners who were equally well-endowed.  Both patterns
can be explained by the operation of either or both of the two following factors: 
(1) The firms which are better-endowed feel that they have all the know-
how they need in-house.  Therefore they would not receive any benefit from
trading with rivals (or others) and do not do so.
(2) A firm which has more proprietary know-how than potential trading
partners will, assuming know-how of equal absolute value is exchanged in a
trade, be worse off in percentage-of-unique-know-how-held terms relative
to competitors than it was pre-trading.  This could reasonably cause a
relative reluctance by better-endowed firms to trade with those having less
proprietary know-how. 
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Informal Know-How Trading In Context
Informal technology trading can usefully be compared with and contrasted
to two other forms of R&D exchange between firms:  (1) agreements to perform
R&D cooperatively; (2) agreements to license or sell proprietary technical
knowledge.  As we will see, informal know-how trading can usefully be seen as an
inexpensive, flexible form of cross-licensing.  Under appropriate conditions, it
appears to function better than either of these better-known alternatives. 
Agreements to trade or license know-how involve firms in less uncertainty
than do agreements to perform R&D cooperatively.  This is because the former
deals with existing knowledge of known value which can be exchanged quickly
and certainly.  In contrast, agreements to perform R&D offer future know-how
conditioned by important uncertainties as to its value and the likelihood that it will
be delivered at all.  (The value of the know-how contracted for is uncertain
because R&D outcomes cannot be predicted with certainty.  The delivery of the
results of cooperative R&D projects to sponsoring firms is somewhat uncertain
because such results are best transferred back to the sponsoring firms in the minds
of employees participating in the cooperative research.  Given the US tradition of
frequent job changes, participants run significant risk of losing the benefits of their
investment by losing the employee[s] they assigned to the project.) 
Informal know-how trading such as that reported here has a lower
transaction cost than more formal agreements to license or sell similar
information.  Transaction costs in informal know-how trading systems are low
because decisions to trade or not trade proprietary know-how are made by
individual, knowledgeable engineers.  No elaborate evaluations of relative rents or
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seeking of approvals from firm bureaucracies are involved.  Although informal,
each engineer's assessment of the relative likely value of the trades he elects to
make may be quite accurate:  An information seeker can tell on the basis of his
first interaction whether the expert advice he is given is of good quality - because
he will immediately seek to apply it.  An information provider can test the level of
the inquirer's expertise and future value as a source of information by the nature
and subtlety of the questions asked.  Also, although a particular informal judgment
of the value of a trade may be quite incorrect, many small transactions are
typically made.  Therefore, the net value of proprietary process know-how given
and received will probably not be strongly biased for or against any participating
firm. 
In general, one may say that informal know-how exchange between rival
and noncompeting firms is the most effective form of cooperative R&D when (1)
the needed know-how exists in the hands of some member of the trading network,
and when (2) the know-how is proprietary only by virtue of its secrecy, and when
(3) the value of a particular traded module is too small to justify an explicit
negotiated agreement to sell, license or exchange.  (Taken together, conditions 2
and 3 have the effect of insuring that the know-how recipient will be free to use
the information he obtains without fear of legal intervention by the "donor" firm.) 
Since much technical progress consists of small, incremental advances(7), the
universe bounded by these three conditions is likely to be a substantial one.
Formal know-how sale or licensing is likely to be preferred when the know-
how in question (1) already exists and (2) is of considerable value relative to the
costs of a formal transaction.  (Experts in the oil and chemical industry report that
they engage in formal licensing and sale rather than informal exchange precisely
because the value of the know-how in question is typically very high.)
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Agreements to perform cooperative R&D must be the form of cooperation
of choice when (1) the needed information does not exist within any firm willing
to trade, license or sell, and when (2) individual firms do not find it worthwhile to
develop modules of the needed know-how independently.  (This would occur
when know-how modules have no profitable applications as modules.  Perhaps
this is often the case, but I am not sure.  Perhaps most "new" know-how in fact
consists largely of existing modules of know-how developed for other purposes.)
Discussion
To this point, I have discussed informal know-how trading as a firm-level
phenomenon involving the trading of innovation-related know-how between
technical personnel.  But the model of such trading which I have presented in this
paper contains no inherent restriction as to the nature of know-how traded or as to
the nature of the trading parties.  Perhaps, therefore, the phenomenon exists and
makes sense for individuals and other types of organizations, and for other types
of know-how as well?  A certain answer must await appropriate research, but there
are intriguing suggestions that informal know-how trading may be quite general. 
For example, Collins (16) has shown that scientists employed by non-profit
laboratories (university and governmental) selectively revealed data to colleages
interested in know-how related to the "TEA laser".  He noted that individuals and
laboratories made conscious and careful discriminations as to what know-how
would be revealed to what recipient, and noted also that "Nearly every laboratory
expressed a preference for giving information only to those who had something to
return."(17)
In arenas where know-how trading is applicable, what is its significance? 
An answer to this question also awaits further research.  However, it seems to me
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possible that it may be an important phenomenon in some arenas.  For example,
Mansfield (18) recently found a general pattern of rapid transfer of proprietary
industrial information from the firms which generated it to others, and suggested
that this might be caused by uncompensated "leakage" of such information to the
detriment of the originating firms.  But perhaps, instead, it is an indicator of
massive know-how trading?  (If the observed information transfer is indeed simple
leakage without compensation to the information generator then, as Mansfield
suggests, innovators face very serious appropriability problems.  If, on the other
hand, the rapid transfer observed is the result of information trading such as that
present in the steel industry, then we may be observing a phenomenon which
actually increases firms' ability to appropriate rent from technical knowhow.)
Whatever the generality of know-how trading turns out to be, I am sure that
further study will also show it can be quite an elaborated phenomenon.  Thus, we
will surely find know-how trading strategies more complex than those envisioned
in a simple, two-party Prisoner's Dilemma, and we may find multiple layers of
trading incentives and strategies active in a single trading entity as well.
One obvious form of know-how trading strategy builds on the observation
that many firms often have a unit of know-how which a trader needs - and some of
these potential trading partners may be direct rivals and some not.  I have focused
on trading between rivals in this paper simply because it is the costliest form of
trade and thus potentially the hardest to explain as economically rational
behavior.  However, in the real world it is likely that firms would prefer to trade
know-how with non-rivals, because traded information may then have less or no
competitive cost.  (It may be possible to study this in an elegant manner by
tracking shifts in information-trading behavior as a potential trading partner shifts
from the status of non-competitor to that of direct rival or vice versa.)
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Second, consider that firms can form coalitions with respect to know-how
trading and restrict that activity to only a subset of firms in their industry.  This
can be profitable under some conditions.  For example, the members of such a
"club" may collectively face a more elastic demand than is faced by the industry as
a whole, and therefore may gain greater returns from (cost-reducing) innovation. 
Thus, US or Japanese semiconductor producers may decide it is to their advantage
to trade know-how with other domestic firms but not with foreign firms - or vice
versa.
Third, consider that stategies may exist which are possible because the
substance of know-how trades is knowledge.  For example, firms may find a
strategy of relatively rapid know-how trading may pay dividends.  Such a strategy
is based on the assumption that a firm receiving know-how in trade does not care
who originally developed it:  He only cares that it has value to him.  Since only
novel know-how is valuable to a recipient (there is no value in getting the same
information twice) a strategy of rapid know-how trading might allow a firm to
exchange its own know-how and the know-how developed by others (obtained
from earlier trades) to firms which still find that know-how novel, a trading
advantage.
As an example of multiple levels of trader existing within a given trading
entity, consider that trading between firms such as that I have documented in this
paper must also involve a different "level" of trader - the individuals who actually
conduct the trades.  It is clear that the benefits to individuals actually engaged in
the trading may differ from those of the firms which employ them.  But they do
not not necessarily differ.  (Consider that an engineer's motive in trading may be in
part to improve his potential marketability to competing firms.  In this case, a
strategy of being helpful to colleages employed by competitors without hurting the
interests of one's present firm by revealing vital proprietary secrets might be
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optimal for the individual trader as well as for the firm.  No one wants to hire
someone with a penchant for betrayal.)  Research may show that the benefits
expected by the different active interests in a trading entity are correlated in
important arenas.  When this is the case, simple models may provide us with a
practical ability to predict know-how trading.  
Studies of informal know-how trading patterns are interesting in their own
right, but they may also serve as useful general tool for researchers and
practitioners.  Thus, if general patterns emerge in the types of know-how
considered to be of high and low competitive importance, researchers may be able
to develop and explore generic "efficient" competitive strategies which involve
both competition and cooperation.  And, if an increased understanding of efficient
competition can allow firms to see some areas of R&D investment as not being of
competitive value, or as offering only "redundant" competitive advantage, they
might find it profitable to cooperate in more aspects of know-how development. 
This would lead to a drop in the cost of a given level of competition - a net social
gain. 
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